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Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Perception
John Shannon Hendrix
In an early treatise, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (Versuch, den Begriff der negative Grössen in die
Weltweisheit einzuführen, 1763), Immanuel Kant developed a theory about
thoughts that are fleeting, negated or cancelled, obscured or darkened. As
certain thoughts become clearer, the other thoughts become less clear and
more obscured (Verdunkelt). Kant’s concept was influenced by the petites
perceptions of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He invoked Leibniz in establishing that only a small portion of the representations which occur in the soul,
as the result of sense perception, are clear and enduring. 1
Gottfried Leibniz conceived of minute perceptions of objects or ideas
which have too little intensity to effect conscious thought. The minute perceptions contribute to ordinary perceptions, but they are so small and there
are so many of them that they pass unnoticed in the consciousness connected
to perception. There are far more minute, unnoticed perceptions than there
are conscious perceptions. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, we
are unaware of objects or ideas being perceived, of the activity of the perception. Until they are combined with other perceptions, most perceptions are
too minute to be distinguished or distinctive. In The Monadology of Leibniz,
conscious perceptions follow unconscious perceptions, because “one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion
can in a natural way come only from a motion.” 2 By the time of Freud, the
minute perceptions of Leibniz were referred to as unconscious mental states,
representations or ideas (Unbewusste Vorstellungen).
The minute perceptions are “vivid in the aggregate but confused as to the
parts,” 3 suggesting that perception is only clear when it has been organized
into a totality, as Plotinus described, and which would be a basis of Kant’s
theory of perception. In Plotinus, perception is organized into a totality by
the activity of the intellectual through imagination, the image-making power,
and the logos endiathetos, the word which is thought but not spoken, the linguistic structure in thought. In Kant, perception is organized into a totality
by the categories of a priori intuition acting through the schemata in the imagination, producing what Kant called the “manifold.” For Leibniz, the relation of the parts to the aggregate in perception represents the relation of the
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finite to the infinite, and the relation of the individual subject to the universe.
An individual is defined by their perceptions which go unnoticed, the vestige
of which form a palimpsest in the individual’s consciousness (in discursive
reason). Traces of previous perceptions, of sense objects or of ideas, contribute to a present state of consciousness. While there is no consciousness of
the previous perceptions, “they could be known by a superior mind,” that is,
the nous poietikos, or the intellectual of Plotinus, the more complex form of
thinking. The traces of the unconscious perceptions in memory play a role in
the becoming conscious of the residues of images, or mnemic residues for
Freud, in the processes of sense perception, imagination, and intellection, in
the formation of the aggregate or manifold out of the individual perceptions.
Those unnoticed perceptions are also responsible for the “pre-established
harmony between the soul and the body” for Leibniz, the relation between
intellect and sense perception, and the perceptions determine equilibrium in
behavior and activity. The perceptions cause a “disquiet,” as in the pathos
caused by sense perception for Plotinus, in nous pathetikos, and they also
cause desire, in the searching on the part of discursive thought for that inaccessible element of its existence. All conscious perceptions contain those
unnoticed perceptions; they would not exist without them. Leibniz cited Plotinus in asserting the necessity of the perceptions and ideas which are unclear
and indistinct, partly resulting from the obscurity of sense knowledge, partly
resulting from the inaccessibility of certain mechanisms of intellection to
discursive reason. “Although the mind, as Plotinus rightly says, contains a
kind of intelligible world within it,” the intellectual or nous poietikos, “very
few things in us can be known distinctly, and the remainder are hidden in
confusion, in the chaos of our perceptions as it were,” 4 according to Leibniz.
In the tradition of classical philosophy, intellectual ideas “do not come
from the senses,” according to Leibniz in the New Essays on Human Understanding (p. 81). They are the product of the inner reflection of the mind, dependent upon intelligibles not connected to sense perception. Ideas that come
from the senses are confused, as Plato established, in the same way that individual perceptions are confused before they are conceived as contributing to
an aggregate, which is a product of intellect not connected to the act of conscious sense perception. Products of the nous poietikos are distinct and not
contaminated by the lack of clarity of the sensible form, species sensibilis, in
the nous hylikos or pathetikos, thought connected to sense perception. Ideas,
products of nous poietikos or the intellectual, exist without our being aware
of them (as in the species apprehensibilis), as Plotinus established. Leibniz
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described them as “natural tendencies…dispositions and attitudes…” (p.
106). We also have traces of perceptions of which we are not aware (as in
the residues of the species sensibilis), but it is possible at any time to become
aware of either sensible or intelligible forms, the traces of which form the
palimpsest of conscious experience. We are hindered in our awareness of
them, in the inner reflection of the mind, by being distracted by the multiplicity and confusion of individual sense perceptions, according to Leibniz,
exactly as Plotinus described.
We are also unaware of how individual sense perceptions are received
and sometimes altered as they are processed in the mechanisms of intellect
and imagination, according to Leibniz. In the simple act of perception, we
are unaware of the mechanisms of intellect and imagination which determine
the particular forms that are directly perceived. For example, in An Essay
Towards a New Theory of Vision in 1709, George Berkeley asserted that the
quality of distance cannot be immediately perceived of itself, but must be a
judgment that is learned through an accumulation of sense perceptions in relation to discursive thought, as in the thought of Grosseteste. Judgment, according to Berkeley, or acquired understanding, the product of a higher
intellect, is the product of experience rather than immediate sense perception; it therefore necessarily involves memory, the traces of perceptions of
sense objects and ideas, the accumulation of which leads to the development
of the imagination, the image-making power. In the Fourth Dialogue of the
Alciphron of Berkeley, “we perceive distance not immediately but by mediation of a sign, which has no likeness to it or necessary connection with it, but
only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things” (§8).5 The
sign is an intelligible, a product of nous poietikos, intellection not connected
to sense perception. The sign unconsciously determines the sense perception,
especially of a quality like distance, which is a product of higher intellection.
The sign is constructed by the intellectual, and has no necessary relation
to the sense perception of the object. As Berkeley explained in the New Theory of Vision, we are “exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are
perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate
objects of sight” (§66). When we perceive an object, we are unaware that
what we are perceiving is the sensible form of the object which has no immediate connection to the object itself, and that the sensible form is formed
in relation to the intelligible form, the idea of the form of the object, by the
inaccessible nous or intuition. It is the idea of the object as given by intellect
that is immediately grasped, the intelligible form, rather than the image itself
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of the object, the sensible form, which is imprinted on memory as a seal or
sign. The objects themselves, according to Berkeley, “are not seen, but only
suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which
alone are seen” (Alciphron, §12). The proper object of sight is the seal or
sign, the imprint or mnemic residue, the intelligible form, which are constructed in intellect and language, memory and imagination, as for Plotinus.
In the Alciphron, “it will not seem unaccountable that men should mistake
the connection between the proper objects of sight and the things signified
by them to be founded in necessary relation or likeness…” (§11). It is thus
“easy to conceive why men who do not think should confound in this language of vision the signs with the things signified,” the intelligible form and
the sensible form, in conscious thought. Conscious thought and perception
are dependent on the mechanisms of the intellectual, nous poietikos, the classical concept of the higher intellect.
In the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant (“A” version, 1781), it is impossible to know an object as a pure sensible object, its noumenal quality, outside its conception as an intelligible in intellect; perception in intellection
transcends the experience of the sensible world in perception. The experience of the world is based on the inaccessibility of reason to the world. The
constructed coherence and totality of the sensible world are necessary for
perception, as perception is a basis for reason, but such totality is impossible
in perception itself; it is only given by a priori intuition. The manifold of the
sensible world is inaccessible to conscious reason: “The absolute whole of
all appearances—we might thus say—is only an idea; since we can never
represent it in image, it remains a problem to which there is no solution”
(A328). 6 Reason as a whole is unrepresentable to itself, and requires the inaccessible nous, intuition or nous poietikos, in order for it to explain itself to
itself. Imprints of sensible objects in perception are “mere representations,”
as for Plotinus or Berkeley, “which as perceptions can mark out a real object
only in so far as the perception connects with all others according to the rules
of the unity of experience” (A495), in a manifold.
As for Berkeley, the relation between thought and a sense object that is
perceived is never direct and is always mediated by the a priori understanding of the object in a totality, according to Kant. “Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding” (A643), the
intellection of the object. The transcendental idea, then, is not just a concept
of an object, but a “thoroughgoing unity of such concepts…” (A645). The
idea of an object is not possible outside the totality of the unity of objects,
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just like a unit of time is not possible outside the totality of time, or a unit of
space is not possible outside the totality of space. The sensible is not possible without the intelligible, and discursive reason is not possible without noetic reason. The object is singular while the idea of it is synthetic, composed
of traces of previous sense perceptions and ideas, and judgments made, thus
the idea of the object cannot possibly correspond to the object.
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Anthropologie in
pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798), although a late work, addressed subjects that
went back to Kant’s lectures at the Albertus University of Königsberg beginning in 1772. 7 In the Anthropology, Kant identified ideas of which we are
not aware with the petites perceptions of Leibniz. “Sense perceptions and
sensations of which we are not aware but whose existence we can undoubtedly infer, that is, obscure ideas…,” Kant said, “constitute an immeasurable
field.” 8 Ideas of which we are not aware, like perceptions of which we are
not aware, constitute most of our ideas, as Kant explained in Section 5 of the
Anthropology, “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them.”
Kant posited two levels of consciousness. The first is direct or unmediated
(unmittelbar), full consciousness in perception. The second is indirect or
mediated (mittelbar), partially unconscious perception involving indirect
representations that are dark and obscure (dunkel), like the petites perceptions of Leibniz; “we can be indirectly conscious of having an idea, although
we are not directly conscious of it” (p. 18). We draw conclusions about what
we perceive without being conscious of perceiving every detail, because, as
for Berkeley, what we perceive is determined by our understanding of it
gained from experience. The majority of our perceptions are of the details
which we do not consciously perceive, but which contribute to the conclusions and judgments we make in the act of perceiving.
We are often victimized by the obscure ideas and sense perceptions,
which cloud our conscious perceptions, and our understanding of ourselves,
as we become an object of obscure ideas, according to Kant. Cognition and
perception are defined as a synthesis of the clear and obscure ideas and perceptions. Cognition consists of a union of an active capacity and a passive
capacity, as in the active intellect (nous poietikos) and passive intellect (nous
hylikos) of Aristotle, in the activity of combining and separating ideas. The
ideas associated with the passive mind, by which the thinking subject is affected, belong to the “sensual cognitive faculty” (Anthropology, p. 25), nous
hylikos, the lower of the two faculties. Sensual cognition is passive in relation to ideas and also to the “inner sense of awareness,” the subjective facul-
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ty that makes cognition possible through imagination.
Intellectual cognition, the higher faculty, on the other hand, has the
“character of spontaneity of apperception,” as in nous poietikos, which is
“the pure consciousness of the act which constitutes thought,” entailing pure
logical deduction. Apperception is the apprehension of the manifold or totality of perception. All empirical or sensuous perception and cognition can
only be of phenomena, of objects as they appear, as opposed to noumena,
objects as they are in themselves. The receptivity of objects of sense as phenomena requires an a priori intuition independent of the empirical sense perception. As Plotinus and Grosseteste argued, the sensible form, is always
already an intelligible form. That which is perceived by the senses is predetermined by the intellectual faculty in the intuition of inner experience. The
formal character of the receptivity of sense objects in the inner intuition is
time, according to Kant. Time is the category of a priori intuition that makes
possible inner experience and sense perception in passive intellect, because it
is an archetypal or intelligible category which is not subject to the divisions
and multiplicity of discursive reason in passive intellect or the phenomenal
objects of the sensual world.
But “through inner experience I always know myself only as I appear to
myself” (Anthropology pp. 26–7). Appearance is the product of empirical
intuition and understanding, that is, intellectual cognition, rather than judgment, or discursive cognition. My perception of my inner experience is in the
form of the intelligible form, which I have constructed in my imagination,
but the source of which I do not have access to. Imagination (facultas imaginandi) is the ability to form an image in the mind’s eye that is independent
of a sensual object or image. Imagination, like cognition, is a synthesis of the
passive and the active. The passive imagination is reproductive, “a faculty of
the derived representation (exhibitio derivativa)” (p. 56), merely reproducing
empirical perceptions as they are recalled to mind within the framework of
the category of time in a priori intuition. The active imagination is productive, producing an original representation of an object (exhibitio originaria)
that precedes experience, taking place in intuition rather than empirical cognition. Perception of intelligibles in the imagination (phantasia), and perception of the a priori categories of space and time, is a faculty of productive
imagination. Passive imagination is connected to empirical cognition, or experience, and is presupposed by it. Active imagination is a function of intellectual cognition, while passive imagination is a function of discursive
cognition, exactly as it was for Plotinus.
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Kant outlined a theory of the imagination in his Reflections on Anthropology (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie) of 1776–8, and continued to develop
it in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) and the Critique of Judgment
(1790). The imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason is seen primarily as
the higher, productive imagination, and the imagination in the Critique of
Judgment is seen in relation to aesthetic judgment. As for Plotinus, the imagination mediates between sense perception and intellectual cognition. The
primary role of imagination is to transform the categories of a priori intuition
into the schemata that organize sense perception and discursive reason. The
importance that Kant placed on the imagination is the equivalent of the importance that Plotinus placed on the imagination in classical philosophy. As
in Plotinus, there is a higher imagination and a lower imagination, one instrumental in the reception and understanding of intelligibles, and one instrumental in the reception and understanding of sense perceptions. In the
various Reflexionen, the notes prior to 1781, and in the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie in particular, Kant defined a variety of imaginative functions in
relation to varying degrees of connection to the sensible world, and varying
degrees of productive capabilities. These were summarized very clearly by
Rudolf Makkreel in Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.
The formative faculty (Bildungsvermögen) is the power to organize and
give form to intelligibles in intuition, which for Plotinus involved the logos
endiathetos, the word in language, and the production of a visual representation or reflection in the mind’s eye. The lower imagination, operating in relation to sense objects or phenomena, storing and preserving them as the eidos
or species sensibilis, is called the Bildungskraft by Kant. The imagination is
the storehouse (Vorrath) of representations. The Bildungskraft is seen to
have the power to give form to an intuition or an intelligible, to create a sensible form from an intelligible form. The higher imagination, called imaginative formation or Einbildung, operates without any connection to
phenomena, or sensible or intelligible form. It is able to produce rather than
just reproduce, and create rather than just recreate. Einbildung is a function
of nous poietikos, while Bildungskraft is a function of nous hylikos. Einbildung forms images through invention (as in the fingendo of Alexander
Gottlieb Baumgarten) and abstraction (as in the abstrahendo of Christian
Wolff). 9
Rudolf Makkreel summarized eight levels of image formation, six of
them involving the mechanisms of imagination. Bildung is the general ability
to organize and give form to intelligibles in intuition which is made use of
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by the mechanisms of imagination. Urbildung is the form of intellectual intuition which is put to use by the higher forms of imagination in the higher
intellect, nous poietikos. The lower imagination is composed of Abbildung,
Nachbildung, and Vorbildung. Abbildung is direct image formation, the
power to depict a sensuous object, or reproduce it as phenomenon. Abbildung makes the image of a sensible object visible so that it can be processed
by the other levels of imagination within the temporal category of a priori
intuition. The image of the Abbildung is limited only to the present moment.
Nachbildung involves the reproduction of images that have already been
formulated by the Abbildung, thus adding a temporal dimension. The Vorbildung, as a function of Abbildung and Nachbildung, reproduces images
from the past and present in anticipation of future images, adding the temporal dimension of the future, and creating a storehouse of images which becomes the vocabulary for sense experience and discursive reason. The
activities of Abbildung, Nachbildung, and Vorbildung are connected to discursive reason and sense perception, and they contribute to the substance of
experience which is defined by the manifold in the process of apperception,
the building of sense experiences of objects and ideas in an architectonic that
provides the ground of experience and the self-consciousness of thought.
The architectonic is subject to the temporal categories in intuition in the inner experience, and the spatial categories of intuition in sense perception.
The activities of Nachbildung and Vorbildung generate images according to
empirical laws of association and are connected to sense objects, but they
nevertheless become functions of an active intellect rather than a passive intellect, in that they are governed by the categories of a priori intuition.
The higher imagination is composed of Einbildung, Ausbildung, and
Gegenbildung, the three categories of imagination that are not connected to
sense perception or empirical experience, and are thus solely the product of
intellectual cognition or the nous poietikos. Einbildung is the power to invent
images not connected to sense perceptions. It is an activity of the soul rather
than material representation, although its invented image (Erdichtung) must
be derived from the images of sense perception. Ausbildung is responsible
for the completion of the invented images in intellection which leads to the
final formation of the invented image in Gegenbildung as symbolic or analogical, an archetype or intelligible, formed by the schemata from the categories in a priori intuition.
In Gegenbildung, the invented, intelligible images become linguistic signifiers, in the same way that the intelligibles of Plotinus are reflected as im-
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ages formed by the logos endiathetos, unspoken language, in discursive reason. The Gegenbildung completes the process of the intelligible, the source
of which as an active intellect, becoming a material form in a representation
or an image in perception, through the analogue (symbolum) or sign of the
logos. The schemata for the three stages of higher imagination unfold from
the temporal categories of a priori intuition. The pure form of archetypal
formation in the Gegenbildung is the Urbildung, which has no connection
whatsoever to the material world, but is solely a pure quality of the soul. The
Urbildung precedes the mechanisms of imagination in cognition.
Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics (Vorlesungen über Metaphysik) consist
of a set of lectures delivered between 1778 and 1780 and are preserved in
student notes. In them the functions of the lower imagination are elaborated
upon, leading to more developed discussions in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Abbildung creates images which are representations in the present; Nachbildung recreates images which are representative of the past; and Vorbildung creates images which anticipate future image formation in cognition
and sense perception. Each is tied to the mechanisms of sense perception and
material images, but also depend on active intellect and intellectual cognition
in their formative powers. The manifold, for example, is present even in Abbildung, as individual perceptions immediately participate in a totality, in a
process of “running through” (durchläuft) the manifold. The mind is conscious in sense perception of forming and receiving images which are composites of many points of view, in the process of apperception. The variety
of petite perceptions of an object are “gathered together” (zusammen nimmt),
although sometimes they can be overwhelming, which Kant discussed later
in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment.
Abbildung combines perceptions from the present, past and future. It thus
involves the reproductive processes of Nachbildung and the anticipatory
processes of Vorbildung. The mechanism of imagination connected to each
is a form of empirical, discursive reason. Its function is to preserve objects of
perception. The functions of the higher imagination, Einbildung, Ausbildung,
and Gegenbildung, have the capacity of “producing images out of themselves (aus sich selbst) independently of the reality of objects.” 10 They have
the ability to absorb the particular perceptions connected to empirical or discursive reason into the manifold or totality of experience, and they have the
ability to form images not connected to immediate sense experience, in a
higher form of intellection, as in nous poietikos, that operates without the
consciousness of sense perception. The linguistic signifiers of Gegenbildung,
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or symbolic analogues, manufacture links between sense perception and intellection that are not given by perception or discursive reason alone. While
even at the lowest level of imagination objects of sense perception are preformed rather than directly given, in Gegenbildung, images in imagination
are formed without any connection to the objects of sense perception.
In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, or the “A” version
(1781), the “transcendental aesthetic” is the “science of all principles of a
priori sensibility…” (A21). In the transcendental aesthetic, space is defined
as an a priori concept that is applied to sense experience, rather than being a
quality of sense experience or being derived from sense experience: “Space
is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions”
(A24). An a priori representation, or intuition of sensibility, is taken as a
concept. Space does not exist in empirical reality, it only exists as a concept
in intellection. At the same time, space can only be a representation, to discursive reason, and not a directly knowable reality. Space is a necessary representation because it is impossible to conceive of the absence of space, thus
all intuition is based on the presence of space in representation. In the second
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, or the “B” version (1787), space
must therefore be “the condition of the possibility of appearances” (B39),
and thus a condition of the possibility of all images formed in imagination.
Space must necessarily be an unconscious intuition of sensibility: we are not
conscious of the necessity of the a priori concept of space during the process
of perception, because space appears to us to be an empirical perception in
discursive, conscious reason. The grounds of perception and reason are inaccessible to us in conscious thought.
Space is a manifold, because it cannot be divided. As a consequence, geometry, or the geometrical representation of space, does not exist as an empirical reality, but rather only an a priori concept of intuition that is applied
to empirical reality in perception and discursive reason. Therefore all products of geometry in intuitive imagination, in Gegenbildung and the higher
forms of imagination not connected to sense perception, exist only as conceptual structures applied to empirical reality. In that space is the form of all
appearances, it is the necessary condition for the eidos, and the intelligible
form. The forms of appearances, as intelligibles, precede actual perceptions,
as established by Plotinus or Robert Grosseteste. Forms of appearances are
based on principles, the principia conoscendi, that are the categories of a
priori intuition unfolded in the imagination to form the underlying basis of
sense perception and discursive reason, in the same way that for Plotinus the
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intelligibles are unfolded in imagination through the logos endiathetos, the
linguistic signifier of Kant’s Gegenbildung.
Time is also not an empirical concept derived from any experience, but
rather a concept in a priori intuition that is defined by its apodictic necessity,
as Kant explained in Section II of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Time is as
well only a representation to discursive reason and sense experience, and is a
necessary basis for the existence of the manifold, as a manifold cannot be
conceived outside of a relation to the successions made possible by the concept of time, along with the concept of space. It is impossible to conceive of
any sensible reality outside of time or space. Time, like space, underlies the
possibility of all perception and discursive reason, without our being conscious of it as a purely a priori intuitive concept with no necessary connection to the perceptions and thoughts of which we are conscious.
As space determines the form of perception, it is the form of outer sense.
Time has no relation to the shape or position of the objects of perception, so
it is the form of the inner sense, or the relations of representations in cognition. Time has no existence in spatial representation, but we attempt to represent it to ourselves in the form of spatial analogies: the continuous,
undivided line representing linear time, or the infinitely recurring circle representing cyclical time. In either case time is represented as a manifold
which cannot be interrupted, although it can be divided, unlike space. The
division of time is a function of discursive reason operating on the intuition
of the inner sense. Regarding space, discursive reason cannot operate on outer sense, or the empirical reality to which it responds. The representation of
both space and time to ourselves in perception and discursive reason is the
product of an a priori intuition.
Because all sensual phenomena are representations and determinations of
the mind, time precedes space in its apodictic necessity as an a priori condition of experience. The condition of the inner appearance, the intelligible
form, determines the condition of the outer appearance, the sensible form.
All representations, whether empirical or intuitive, are connected to the inner
sense. Time in the inner sense is the condition of the possibility of the manifold, as all things, all sensible perceptions, are given a relationship in time.
In apperception, in the combination of perceptions which conform to the a
priori manifold, all sense objects are given a place in space and time. The
placement of the sense object is determined by a priori relationships of intuition. A sense object that is perceived is understood in a particular spatial relation to other objects, while the perception of the object is understood in
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relation to the perception and representation of other objects in time. In
dreams, objects in the imagination may appear independent of the spatial relations that governed their perception as sense objects, and independent of
the temporal relations that governed the perception of them, as analyzed by
Freud. Dreams function independently of the manifold of space and time that
organizes conscious reason. As Freud would say, dreams have no intention
of communicating anything, so they are able to operated outside the framework of the linguistic mechanisms, the linguistic signifier or the logos endiathetos, that transform intelligibles into images, establishing the basis of
the relation between reason and perception, between the human mind and the
world as it is perceived and represented. Dreams must be a function of the
higher forms of imagination, the Einbildung, Ausbildung, and Gegenbildung
of Kant, which operate independently of the relations of empirical perception
and discursive reason, the relations dictated by the manifold or a priori categories of space and time.
Time is necessary for a manifold to be understood or represented as a
manifold to conscious thought. Time is the basis for the “synthesis of apprehension” (A99) that is connected to the representation of the manifold and
the intuition that is the basis of the manifold. The synthesis of apprehension
is a priori, prior to empirical experience and representation, and not connected to empirical experience. Thus it functions in the higher forms of imagination, as in intellection or nous poietikos. The representations of space and
time that are given to discursive reason depend on the synthesis of apprehension, as a manifold itself. The manifold, composed of space and time as the
categories of a priori intuition, depends of the synthesis of apprehension,
which is a synthesis of the inner and outer sense, and of a priori intuition and
perception. It is thus a synthesis of the subjective (ideal) and the objective
(real), and represents an absolute in Hegelian terms. The absolute, as the
manifold and the synthesis of apprehension, is necessary for all thought and
experience. Without the categories of a priori intuition, empirical imagination would be unknowable to conscious reason, and would be unable to function in relation to sense perception.
Time, as the a priori category of inner sense or intuition, is the necessary
ground of the “synthetic unity of appearances” (A101) in the manifold, and
makes possible the reproduction of them in the imagination, and the representation of them to discursive reason. Appearances “are not things in themselves,” but rather “the mere play of our representations,” as phenomena
rather than noumena, based on the determinations of inner sense, and the
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categories of space and time. The play of the representations of appearances
is possible in the higher forms of imagination and intellection, thinking and
imagining not connected to the empirical experience. Freed from the relations of perception governed by the rules of synthetic apprehension and the
categories of the manifold, appearances can be reproduced and reconstructed
by imagination in such a way that different realities from empirical reality
can be created. Different realities are bound to the categories of space and
time in conscious thought, but in unconscious thought and imagination, in
dreams for example, realities can be created from the representation of appearance, the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of Freud, outside the unconscious
manifold. The transcendental synthesis of imagination, which is a product of
the synthesis of apprehension in the manifold, or the absolute, is the condition for the possibility of all experience, which is the condition for the possibility of the reproduction of appearances in imagination.
Thus the “synthesis of apprehension” in reason is “inseparably bound up
with the synthesis of reproduction” (A102) in imagination. The synthesis of
apprehension is the transcendental ground of the possibility of all
knowledge, both empirical and a priori, while the synthesis of reproduction
in imagination is the transcendental ground of all thought. The succession of
representations in the reproduction of images in the imagination is made
possible by the category of time; without the succession of images, conscious thought would not be possible. The unity of the manifold can only be
given as a representation in conscious thought; as an a priori category, time
is inaccessible to conscious thought. The unity of time only exists as it is unfolded in discursive reason through the mechanisms of imagination, in the
translation of intelligibles to images through language. The products of the
categories of space and time, geometry and mathematics, can only function
as organizing principles in relation to perception in conscious reason, although as pure concepts they only exist in intuition, as intelligibles.
The relation of the unity of apperception to the synthesis of imagination
is defined as understanding. We understand something in perception when it
corresponds to the a priori idea of it, as it has been apprehended in imagination. All possible perceptions must conform to the “necessary unity of the
pure synthesis of imagination” (A119); otherwise they would not be knowable. The a priori modes of knowledge that contain such unity in the understanding are the categories, the “pure concepts of understanding.”
Knowledge must include an understanding related to the objects of perception; such understanding is given by a priori intuition and imaginative syn-
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thesis. All appearances and representations must conform to the understanding, as the sensible form must conform to the intelligible form. All experience of perception is made possible by noetic thinking of objects as
phenomena or representations in the unity of the manifold of synthetic apperception in a priori intuition; objects cannot be known in themselves, nor
can they be known as phenomena. Appearances have a “necessary relation to
the understanding”: they would not be possible without it.
If an appearance were not an object of knowledge, it would have no objective reality and no existence, according to Kant, recalling the idealism of
Berkeley. All appearances contain a manifold a priori, and can only be
known in combination, derived from the transcendental synthesis of intuition
and higher imagination, in combination with the empirical synthesis of lower
imagination. The action of the productive synthesis of the imagination directed at perceptions is apprehension. Apprehension invests the form of the
image or appearance in perception with the manifold of intuition, and in order to do so it must have previously processed the appearance in the imagination, recalling again the thought of Berkeley, as in the Alciphron “we
perceive distance not immediately but by mediation of a sign, which has no
likeness to it or necessary connection with it, but only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things” (§8), and in the New Theory of Vision, we are “exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are perceived
only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate objects of
sight” (§66). None of this is possible without the “subjective ground” of the
inner sense or category of a priori intuition that is time, which organizes perceptions in relation to past and subsequent perceptions in the empirical faculty of the imagination: Abbildung, creating representations in the present;
Nachbildung, recreating images which represent the past; and Vorbildung,
creating images which anticipate future images.
The subjective ground of time governs the rules of association between
images in perception, imagination, and apprehension. While the subjective
ground is the inner sense or intuition, the objective ground is consciousness
in perception and apprehension. The objective ground of consciousness is
necessary to unite all appearances in empirical imagination as part of the
same and only consciousness. Even if the appearances were ordered in succession by the intuition of time, they would still not have the necessity of
participating in the same unity. The single consciousness insures that all appearances conform to the categories, the universal principles that are the basis of knowledge. The unity is found in apperception, and all appearances
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must conform to the unity of apperception in order to be apprehended. The
unity of apperception is the “objective unity of all empirical consciousness in
one consciousness” (Critique of Pure Reason, A123), which is “the necessary condition of all possible perception.” All appearances must have a certain affinity in a manifold, which is a consequence of the transcendental
synthesis in imagination.
The necessary unity of apperception is provided by the transcendental
synthesis of the productive imagination, the subjective inner sense, in combination with consciousness in perception and thought, the Cartesian “I
think.” Transcendental apperception is distinguished from empirical apperception, just as transcendental imagination is distinguished from empirical
imagination, because there must be an a priori representation for all perceptions, in order that perceptions might exist. As perceptions are dependent on
a priori representations, a priori representations cannot be dependent on any
empirical reality outside of apprehension and imagination. Transcendental
apperception is the “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (B132), as
all representations are only unified in belonging to one and the same consciousness. The self-consciousness of empirical representations is made possible by the transcendental unity of apperception, which is made possible by
the manifold in intuition. While the unity of apprehension depends on the
self-consciousness of the perceiving individual, it also depends on the participation of individual self-consciousness in a universal or self-consciousness,
ensuring the universality of the linguistic rules, derived from the principles
of the categories, that govern the apprehension of a representation in imagination. Kant was in this way an early structuralist, arguing for the necessity
of universal rules of thought and language.
The apperception of the manifold involves a synthesis of representations
that is made possible through a consciousness of the synthesis in discursive
reason, connected to empirical perception. Empirical consciousness has no
necessary relation to the inner sense or the subjective experience without all
individual representations being combined in a synthetic consciousness.
Consciousness comes about in the relation between perception and language,
specifically in the formation of the intelligible image in imagination, which
connects the perceiving subject to what is being perceived, in the representation. I am only conscious of the world around me in my perception of it
when I can represent it to myself in apperception and imagination. I am only
conscious of the world around me as a representation to myself; my consciousness is my perception of my own representations, in relation to my use
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of language, which provides the representations, as for Plotinus. The “analytic unity of apperception” (B133), in empirical thought or discursive reason,
is given by the “synthetic unity of apperception” in the transcendental aesthetic, the principles of a priori sensibility, which paves the way for the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, and the possibility of knowledge and
perception.
The synthesis of the manifold in pure concepts relates them to the unity
of apperception, both transcendental and empirical, and is the basis for a priori knowledge, which depends on understanding, and the faculty of representation in imagination. Through the manifold of representations in
imagination, in relation to the synthetic unity of apperception, understanding
is able to identify the intuition in the inner sense as the basis of experience.
The categories, the forms of the pure concepts, take objective form in the
representations in the imagination, and are thus connected to the objects of
sense perception, as they are themselves representations in the imagination.
They are only appearances, “for it is solely of appearances that we can have
a priori intuition” (B151).
The a priori synthesis of the sensible manifold of intuition, as it is represented to discursive reason, is called the “figurative synthesis” (synthesis
speciosa), in contrast to the synthesis of the manifold in the categories of intuition in understanding, which is the “intellectual synthesis” (synthesis intellectualis). Both forms of synthesis are a priori and transcendental, and
necessary for all other a priori knowledge. The figurative synthesis is the
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, wherein the imagination represents an intelligible of a sense object in intuition. It is the higher, productive
imagination, that is able to represent a sense object without the sense object
being present. As for Plotinus, imagination operates midway between intuition (intellection) and sense perception. It connects sensible representations
from empirical experience with the synthesis in the categories of a priori intuition, in its transcendental synthesis in the understanding. The intellectual
synthesis is a product of understanding alone, without a connection to imagination, or to sense perception. Figurative synthesis is connected to the lower, reproductive imagination, and the empirical laws of sense perception.
Intellectual synthesis is connected to the higher, productive imagination,
which does not involve the empirical laws of sense perception, as in the nous
poietikos, the intellectual or productive intellect. Figurative synthesis is a
rhetorical synthesis, as opposed to a literal synthesis, that is, a synthesis represented in language.
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In the thought of Plotinus, in a scheme that seems very similar to the
Kantian one, and anticipated the concepts of Hegel and Freud, imagination
facilitates the translation of sensible objects in perception to intellection. The
intellectual act is not possible without an accompanying mental image. The
ability to form the image (eidos), appearance or representation, in the mind’s
eye is always accompanied by the “verbal expression” (Enneads IV.3.30), 11
or more accurately, the logos endiathetos, the word in thought, as Plotinus
seems to have intended it. The intelligible image, and thus the sensible image, is not possible without the linguistic expression of it, and linguistic expression is not possible without the intelligible image. Perception of sensible
objects is only possible after the idea of the sensible object is articulated in
language in intellection. While the “intellectual act is without parts,” according to Plotinus, as in the a priori synthesis of the manifold in intuition, it has
not been differentiated in discursive reason through the logos endiathetos in
imagination, and thus in sense perception, and it “has not, so to speak, come
out into the open, but remains unobserved within.”
But “the verbal expression,” or the logos endiathetos, “unfolds its content,” from intellection or intuition, “and brings it out of the intellectual act
into the image-making power,” allowing imagination to form the intelligible
image that corresponds to the sensible image in memory, as in the thought of
Kant. In doing so, the linguistic articulation “shows the intellectual act as if
in a mirror,” for Plotinus, or a representation, as a mirror reflection might
represent a sensible object, but the linguistic articulation in discursive reason
does not contain the intellectual act; the intellectual act, like the intellectual
synthesis, and the productive imagination, remains separated from sense perception and sensible reality, and discursive reason, wherein can be found the
figurative synthesis, as the linguistic representation, logos endiathetos, of the
intelligible, or the transcendental synthesis. The intellectual act of Plotinus is
inaccessible, as the a priori transcendental synthesis of the manifold.
The logos endiathetos, as the unarticulated word, can be seen as Plotinus’ “silent rational form” (Enneads III.8.6) and the “rational principle”
which “must not be outside but must be united with the soul of the learner,
until it finds that it is its own,” like the categories of a priori intuition in the
inner sense of Kant. Once the soul of Plotinus has “become akin to and disposed according to the rational principle,” the logos, or the schemata of Kant
unfolding the categories, it “utters and propounds it,” forming the representation of the intelligible idea in relation to the representation of the object of
sense perception. The spoken word in language, logos prophorikos, is an im-
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itation of the logos endiathetos in the same way that the figurative synthesis
is an imitation of the intellectual synthesis, and reproductive imagination is
an imitation of productive imagination, but connected to perception. According to Plotinus, the logoi of discursive reason, “by means of senseperception—which is a kind of intermediary when dealing with sensible
things—do appear to work on the level of sense and think about sense objects” (Enneads I.4.10). Discursive reason depends on representations of
thought in intellect, or the representations of the categories in imagination.
Consciousness “exists and is produced when intellectual activity is reflexive
and when that in the life of the soul which is active in thinking is in a way
projected back,” as the representation formed by the logos, “as happens with
a mirror-reflection when there is a smooth, bright, untroubled surface.”
The schemata of Kant, in the words of Rudolf Makkreel, in Imagination
and Interpretation in Kant, are “a priori products of the imagination that mediate between concepts and empirical appearances,” 12 as the logos endiathetos might mediate between the intelligible and the sensible form in the
thought of Plotinus. The schema has no empirical content, but must be both
intellectual and sensible, as the imagination of Plotinus is both intellectual
and sensible. The schemata apply the categories to imagination in order to
form the groundwork of the subjective empirical experience of the objects of
sense perception. Imagination mediates between the categories as universal
concepts and sensible intuition as composed of empirical particulars. The
framework for the mediation is time, within which the categories are unfolded as particulars, from the subjective intuition of inner sense to the objective
cogitation of nous pathetikos or discursive reason. The framework of time
allows for the temporal associations of representations to be combined in
such a way as the manifold can be translated into perception. The most important function of the productive, transcendental imagination is to produce
the temporal schemata, through representation in language, so that the sensible can be experienced as a manifold in intuition.
There are schemata of both sensible concepts in discursive thought and
pure concepts of the understanding in intuition. As the framework for the
function of imagination, which is both sensible and intelligible, reproductive
and productive, schemata are both sensible and intelligible. The schemata of
the pure concepts are independent of any sensible form and thus cannot be
translated into an image, while the schemata of the sensible concepts are that
through which images are possible in imagination. The schema is not a property of a sensible concept, but is a necessary basis for any sensible concept.
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The schema is an archetype, the universal concept to which all particular
forms must conform, but in relation to which all are imperfect or incomplete
realizations. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the example is given of the triangle (A141), the schema of which cannot correspond to any image or representation, as it is a construct of geometry and mathematics, manifestations of
the categories of space and time, intuitions that are applied to sensible reality
a priori, thus preceding any possible formal representation.
In the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Kritik der
Urteilskraft, 1790), pleasure is connected with the “apprehension of the form
of an object of intuition,” and expresses the “conformity of the object to the
cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgement…” (VII,
189, 17–24),13 recalling Ficino’s definition of love. The image is the form in
the imagination, the intelligible form that is a product of a priori intuition;
pleasure is a function of the imagination, not sense perception. All sense perception is dependent on the synthesis of apprehension. Imagination is the active faculty for the synthesis of the manifold, as connected to the
understanding. The apprehension that produces pleasure is an apprehension
of particular relations of space and time as given by the categories in intuition. Sensations are synthesized in the imagination to create a form or appearance. If the synthesis of sensations corresponds with the pure a priori
concepts, then pleasure results, as love and beauty for Ficino, and an object
of sense, as the form or appearance in the imagination, is judged to be beautiful. If a sense object does not conform to the organization of reality in
sense perception as given by a priori intuition, then it is judged to be ugly.
In order for a sense object to be perceived, judged to be beautiful, and
give pleasure, it must conform to the intelligible appearance of it in the imagination, derived from the categories of a priori intuition. Kant sees elements of sense perception such as colors, tones, shadows, etc., to be products
of the manifold of perception, or apperception, rather than individual perceptions. They participate in spatial and temporal sequences, and in a play of
perceptions that forms the manifold. The spatial and temporal sequences are
not present in a perception itself, nor is the play of perceptions that forms the
manifold, but they make the perception possible. No sense object can be perceived outside a relation to other sense objects. Perceptions are brought together in the imagination, and sensible and intelligible forms in the
imagination are a product of the manifold of perceptions in imagination, not
individual sense objects outside their participation in the manifold. Pleasure
and aesthetic judgment are the product of the manifold of perceptions, the
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relations between objects of sense. Kant developed theories of language and
perception in classical philosophy, in the neoplatonic, peripatetic, scholastic,
and humanistic traditions, and laid the groundwork for theories of language
and perception in the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan.
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